Introduction: Perceived Legitimacy and the State Judiciary by Nunn, G. Alexander
Vanderbilt Law Review
Volume 70
Issue 6 Issue 6 - November 2017 Article 8
11-2017
Introduction: Perceived Legitimacy and the State
Judiciary
G. Alexander Nunn
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr
Part of the Courts Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Vanderbilt Law
Review by an authorized editor of Scholarship@Vanderbilt Law. For more information, please contact mark.j.williams@vanderbilt.edu.
Recommended Citation
G. Alexander Nunn, Introduction: Perceived Legitimacy and the State Judiciary, 70 Vanderbilt Law Review 1813 (2017)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.vanderbilt.edu/vlr/vol70/iss6/8
Introduction: Perceived Legitimacy
and the State Judiciary
G. Alexander Nunn*
By and large, judicial authority is a product of perceived
validity.' Judges lack an independent means of enforcement; they wield
"no influence over either the sword or the purse," "neither force nor
will." 2 Rather, the judicial branch operates under the auspices of its
legitimacy, "a product of substance and perception that shows itself in
the people's acceptance of the Judiciary as fit to determine what the
Nation's law means and to declare what it demands."3 When the public
sees the judiciary as legitimate, it accepts and adheres to its rulings
even when it may perceive certain decisions to be ideologically opposed
or legally incorrect;4 public perception thus drives the "power" and
"prerogative" of the courts.5 Where public perception sours, the rule of
law itself is threatened, "sap[ping] the foundations of public and private
* Ph.D. candidate, Yale University; J.D., 2016, Vanderbilt Law School. Many thanks to
Tracey George, Susanna Rychlak, and Alex Carver for inviting me to contribute to a fascinating
Symposium. Thanks as well to Thomas Kadri for helpful discussions regarding this piece. Finally,
thanks to the staff of the Vanderbilt Law Review for their exceptional work in editing this
introduction.
1. See Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176, 1188 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Berzon, J.,
concurring).
2. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 433, 465 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(capitalization removed); see also Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1659 (2015); Wolfson,
811 F.3d at 1188 (Berzon, J., concurring). Of course, the judiciary's lack of an independent means
of enforcement was noted infamously, if also apocryphally, by President Andrew Jackson. JON
MEACHAM, AMERICAN LION: ANDREW JACKSON IN THE WHITE HOUSE 204 (2008) ("John Marshall
has made his decision, now let him enforce it.").
3. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992); accord Republican
Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 793 (2002) (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("The power and the
prerogative of a court . .. rest, in the end, upon the respect accorded to its judgments.").
4. TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW 73 (Princeton Univ. Press 2006) (1990)
("People may believe specific decisions are wrong, even wrongheaded, and individual judges
unworthy of their offices and still continue to support the court if they respect it as an institution
that is generally impartial, just and competent." (quoting Walter Murphy & Joseph F. Tanenhaus,
Public Opinion and the United States Supreme Court: A Preliminary Mapping of Some
Prerequisites for Court Legitimation ofRegime Changes, in FRONTIERS OF JUDICIAL RESEARCH 275
(Joel B. Grossman & Joseph Tanenhaus eds., 1969))).
5. White, 536 U.S. at 793 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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confidence, and ... introduc[ing] in its stead universal distrust and
distress."6
Given that legitimacy is the lifeblood of the judicial branch,
maintaining public respect for the judiciary as an institution driven by
legal principles is a structural imperative-"a state interest of the
highest order"7-on which the rule of law depends.8 But what steps need
be taken to safeguard judicial legitimacy? What does the public demand
of the judiciary before recognizing and respecting its authority "to say
what the law is?"9
Certain principles are beyond dispute. A judiciary possessed of
near-complete independence, utmost competence, and absolute probity
has been an essential foundation of the Anglo-American system of
justice.10 Empirically, legitimacy has been shown to be heavily
influenced by "the fairness of the way .. . judges make decisions";"
normatively, judicial decisions are almost universally seen as
appropriate when they call legal "balls and strikes,"2 although many
argue that it is also appropriate for the courts to proactively protect
certain rights in the absence of (or perhaps in the face of contrary)
6. THE FEDERALIST No. 78, supra note 2, at 438; accord Wolfson, 811 F.3d at 1188 (Berzon,
J., concurring).
7. Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., 556 US. 868, 889 (2009) (quoting White, 536 U.S. at
793 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
8. Wolfson, 811 F.3d at 1188 (Berzon, J., concurring).
9. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
10. See N.Y. State Bd. of Elections v. L6pez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 212 (2008) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring). The roots of modern day judicial independence, for example, trace as far back as the
Magna Carta, which proclaims, 'To no one will we sell, to no one will we refuse or delay, right or
justice." Williams-Yulee v. Fla. Bar, 135 S. Ct. 1656, 1666 (2015) (citing MAGNA CARTA cl. 40
(1215), in WILLIAM SHARP MCKECHNIE, MAGNA CARTA: A COMMENTARY ON THE GREAT CHARTER
OF KING JOHN 395 (2d ed. 1914)). The desire for an independent judiciary was at the forefront of
the Declaration of Independence, which charged King George with "obstruct[ing] the
Administration of Justice" by making "judges dependent on his Will alone." THE DECLARATION OF
INDEPENDENCE para. 11 (U.S. 1776); Wolfson, 811 F.3d at 1188 (Berzon, J., concurring). Following
the Revolutionary War, the Founders emphasized the importance of judicial nonpartisanship lest
the public "fear that the pestilential breath of faction may poison the fountains of justice [and t]he
habit of being continually marshaled on opposite sides will be too apt to stifle the voice both of law
and of equity." Wolfson, 811 F.3d at 1188 (Berzon, J., concurring) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
81, supra note 2, at 452 (Alexander Hamilton)). And the common law judicial oath, like the oath
taken by state and federal judges today, bound a judge to "do right to all manner of people ...
without fear or favour, affection or ill-will." Williams-Yulee, 135 S. Ct. at 1666 (citing 10
ENCYCLOPAEDIAOF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 105 (2d ed. 1908)); see 28 U.S.C. § 453 (2012) (requiring
federal judges to "administer justice without respect o persons, and do equal right to the poor and
to the rich").
11. TYLER, supra note 4, at 72-74 (emphasis added).
12. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 55 (2005) (statement
of John G. Roberts, Jr.).
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legislation.13 And of course, partisan politics is anathema where the
judiciary is concerned.14
But as one would imagine, the requisite calculation for
discerning judicial legitimacy includes within its scope a multitude of
additional factors only tangentially alluded to here-factors including,
but not limited to, the demographic composition of the judiciary,15
whether the judiciary achieves distributive justice in decisionmaking
by treating all citizens alike,16 and whether the judiciary is responsive,
vel non, to external sociocultural influences.17 Each of the following four
Symposium articles builds on the existing literature by examining
issues that directly implicate the perceived legitimacy of state courts.
Consider, first, Professors Tracey George and Albert Yoon's
article examining the demographics of the state judiciary.18 At the
outset, George and Yoon recognize that the perceived legitimacy of
courts is not only conditional on the fairness, independence, and
competence of the judiciary but is also heavily influenced by who serves
as a judge,19 a proposition that has received normative and empirical
support.20 George and Yoon find, however, that a significant
demographic gap exists between many states' benches and their
constituent populations; state "courts are not representative of the
people whom they serve."21 They thus bring to the fore an issue that is
sure to weigh heavily in the discussion of judicial legitimacy: Will the
people accept that the state judiciary is "fit to determine what the ...
law means and to declare what it demands"22 if it is not representative
of their own demographic composition?
13. See generally ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, THE CASE AGAINST THE SUPREME COURT (2014).
14. One need only look to the continued discussion surrounding the Supreme Court's
landmark decision in Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
15. Tracey E. George & Taylor Grace Weaver, The Role of Personal Attributes and Social
Backgrounds on Judging, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF U.S. JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (Lee Epstein &
Stefanie A. Lindquist eds., 2017).
16. TYLER, supra note 4, at 72-74.
17. This final factor was of particular importance during the legal realism movement that
dominated the early part of the twentieth century. See generally Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental
Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 822 (1935); Oliver Wendell Holmes,
The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REV. 457 (1897), reprinted in 110 HARV. L. REV. 991 (1997);
Roscoe Pound, The Need of a Sociological Jurisprudence, 19 GREEN BAG 607 (1907).
18. Tracey E. George & Albert H. Yoon, Measuring Justice in State Courts: The Demographics
of the State Judiciary, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1887 (2017).
19. Id. at 1891 (citing JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, CITIZENS, COURTS, AND
CONFIRMATIONS: POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE (2009)).
20. Nancy Scherer, Diversifying the Federal Bench: Is Universal Legitimacy for the U.S.
Justice System Possible?, 105 Nw. U. L. REV. 587 (2011); see also George & Weaver, supra note 15.
21. George & Yoon, supra note 18, at 1894.
22. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 865 (1992).
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In a pair of articles, Professors Christina Boyd, Michael Nelson,
Michael Fix, and Gbemende Johnson hone in on gender issues within
state judiciaries. Boyd and Nelson, for instance, empirically examine
whether a trial judge's gender impacts criminal sentencing decisions.23
Within the confines of their dataset, they find that "[c]ompared to male
defendants, female defendants are sentenced significantly more
leniently by female judges, while female defendants tend to receive
harsher sentences than a similarly situated male defendant when a
male judge is behind the bench."24 This conclusion directly implicates
the perceived legitimacy of the state judiciary given the central role that
distributive justice plays therein; after all, the "perception of unequal
treatment is the single most important source of popular dissatisfaction
with the American legal system."25 Fix and Johnson tackle the issue
from a different angle, empirically examining whether gender affects
public perception of state court decisions.26 Although their research
finds promising indications that gender stereotypes regarding the role
of state judges may be decaying over time,27 it nonetheless
acknowledges that public perceptions of legitimacy are significantly
influenced by the gender of the party affected by judicial decisions.28
Like Boyd and Nelson, Fix and Johnson materially advance the
discussion regarding how gender interrelates with court legitimacy,
challenging the reader to consider whether perceived judicial legitimacy
not only requires egalitarian fairness in deliberative and adjudicative
process but also demands careful judicial recognition and management
of outcomes.29
Finally, Professor Jonathan Nash provides keen insight on the
issue of judicial legitimacy by empirically examining it from an internal
perspective.30 That is, Nash endeavors to track "judicial laterals"-the
23. Christina L. Boyd & Michael J. Nelson, The Effects of Trial Judge Gender and Public
Opinion on Criminal Sentencing Decisions, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1819 (2017).
24. Id. at 1844.
25. Austin Sarat, Studying American Legal Culture: An Assessment of Survey Evidence, 11
LAw & SocY REV. 427, 434 (1977); see also Jason Sunshine & Tom R. Tyler, The Role of Procedural
Justice and Legitimacy in Shaping Public Support for Policing, 37 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 513, 517
(2003).
26. Michael P. Fix & Gbemende E. Johnson, Public Perceptions of Gender Bias in the
Decisions of Female State Court Judges, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1845 (2017).
27. Id. at 1873.
28. Id.
29. Empirical studies have shown that judicial outcomes do indeed relate to the perceived
legitimacy of the court. TYLER, supra note 4, at 72. However, many would deem an overriding
judicial consideration of the practical and socioeconomic impact of a court's decisions a form of
legal realism not wholeheartedly endorsed for almost a century. See generally Cohen, supra note
17; Holmes, supra note 17; Pound, supra note 17.
30. Jonathan Remy Nash, Judicial Laterals, 70 VAND. L. REV. 1911 (2017).
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movement of a judge from a position in one judicial system (be it state
or federal) to another.31 Among other significant findings, his research
reveals that the overwhelming majority of judicial laterals run from
state judiciaries to their federal counterpart and, where judges have
moved in the opposite direction, it was usually because they were
moving to a comparably "higher" court in a state system (i.e., moving
from a federal district court to a state appellate court).32 Although Nash
acknowledges the multitude of factors that might motivate a judicial
lateral, an undeniable component of such a decision is the relative
prestige of the state and federal judicial systems.33 Reconciled against
the backdrop created by this Symposium's other articles, the reader of
Nash's piece must wrestle with an unavoidable question: To what
extent, if any, does the near-unidirectional nature of judicial laterals
out of the state judicial system influence its perceived legitimacy?
Ultimately, judicial legitimacy is the glue that holds our system
of justice together; it is, as noted, a "structural imperative on which the
rule of law depends."34 The following four articles in this Vanderbilt
Law Review Symposium critically examine issues that directly
implicate the perceived legitimacy of the state judiciary.
31. Id. at 1911-12.
32. Id. at 1927.
33. Id. at 1911, 1913.
34. Wolfson v. Concannon, 811 F.3d 1176, 1187 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Berzon, J.,
concurring).
2017] 1817

